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COMMENTS
THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY UPON
INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS
The tax liability of an individual and corporate taxpayer is re-
duced by the deduction from gross income of those amounts which
constitute ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in the pursuit
of a trade or business.' However, although it may be assumed that
this requisite is met, deductibility is not necessarily guaranteed,
for an additional limitation may be imposed by the court-madeC'public policy doctrine."' As the principal difficulty created by this
doctrine is determining its applicability to individual cases,' the pri-
mary purpose of this Comment will be an attempt to determine the
limits of public policy insofar as it is applicable to federal income
tax deductions.
I. PUBLIC POLICY LIMITATIONS UPON BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS
A. Historical Development
The origin of the public policy doctrine is obscure, primarily
because its application has never been confined to one exclusive field
of law.4 It appears that its application to the tax field originated in
'Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (formerly section 23(a) (1) (A)
of the 1939 Code). This section was substantially the same in the Tariff Act of 1913, 38
Star. 114, 167 (1915), and now reads as follows:
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including-
(1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services
actually rendered;
(2) traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals and lodg-
ing) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business; and
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the con-
tinued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of property to
which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no
equity.
As what is "ordinary and necessary" varies in accordance with the nature of businesses,
the type of activity in which the taxpayer is engaged is material. See 4 Mertens, Law of
Federal Income Taxation § 25.09 (1954).
'The "public policy doctrine" is solely the product of case law. See National Brass
Works v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 526, 530 (9th Cir. 1950):
It is true that neither the tax statute nor the treasury regulations condition deduct-
ibility upon the lawful character, either directly or remotely, of the expenditure
made. . . . But, in the nature of things, public policy must narrow the field of
allowable deductions which rest as they do upon legislative indulgence.
'Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958):
Although each case must turn on its own facts, . . . the test of nondeductibility
always is the severity and immediacy of the frustration resulting from allowance of
the deduction. The flexibility of such a standard is necessary if we are to accommo-
date both the congressional intent to tax only net income, and the presumption against
congressional intent to encourage violation of declared public policy.
4 See Winfield, Public Policy in the English Common Law, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 76 (1929).
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England! Apparently, the first judicial pronouncement in the United
States regarding public policy limitations upon tax deductions ap-
peared on the state level in 1921.' The doctrine first appeared in the
federal tax field in a series of Board of Tax Appeals cases (from
1924) which disallowed the deduction of certain expenses.7 Still
later, the doctrine appeared in terms of "legislative intent"' and in
the application of the "ordinary and necessary" business expense test.'
Implicit in the doctrine was the idea that an expense could be
deducted only if the business was legitimate." Conversely, illegal
businesses received harsh tax treatment in that almost any expense
would be considered in furtherance of the unlawful enterprise and,
accordingly, denied deduction. Recent decisions have modified this
See Note, 59 Yale L.J. 561, 562 n.4 (1950). See also Inland Revenue Commissioners
v. Warnes & Co., Ltd., (1919) 2 K.B. 444. In answer to the question of whether or not a
penalty could be deducted which had been imposed for carrying on a trade in an unlawful
manner, Scrutton, L. J., epitomized the inextricable reasoning of resorting to the basis of
public policy:
I confess that to the question so stated it seems to me that the obvious answer is
"Of course he cannot." But as Lord Macnaghten once said in the House of Lords,
the clearer a proposition is the more difficult it often is to find authority in support
of it; and when one comes to state the reasons why that obvious answer should be
given perhaps it is not so easy as saying "Of course he cannot." Commissioners of
Inland Revenue v. Alexander von Glehn & Co., Ltd., (1920) 2 K.B. 553,571.
6In People ex rel. Konigswald v. Wendell, 198 App. Div. 956, 189 N.Y. Supp. 550
(1921), the majority in a per curiam decision disallowed a claimed gambling loss deduction
on relator's state income tax return on the basis of public policy. The dissent expressed
its disapproval in citing Matter of Lampson, 161 N.Y. 511, 56 N.E. 9 (1900), quoting
from that case:
. . . the public policy of the state is evidenced in the public acts of its legislative
body, and is defined and applied in the decisions of its courts," and "it is better
to adhere to the plain language of the law than to resort to the unsafe ground of
inference, or of public policy.
7See Wolf Mfg. Co., 10 B.T.A. 1161 (1928); Great Northern Ry., 8 B.T.A. 225
(1927), aff'd, 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 855 (1930); Columbus
Bread Co., 4 B.T.A. 1126 (1926); Norvin R. Lindheim, 2 B.T.A. 229 (1925); Sarah
Backer, I B.T.A. 214 (1924). Dictum of the Supreme Court at an early stage appeared
to have a profound influence on allowance of deductions. In reply to the allegation that a
deduction should be had for bribery if claimed, Justice Holmes remarked: " . . . it will
be time enough to consider the question when a taxpayer has the temerity to raise it."
(Emphasis supplied.) See United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 264 (1927).
'Clarke v. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384 (1930). In effect the
principle of public policy is applied when the courts speak in terms of "legislative intent"
because the views of the public are reflected in the legislative acts.
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a). The theory is usually expressed that "the law will
not recognize the necessity of engaging in illegal courses in the conduct of a business." Na-
tional Outdoor Advertising Bureau v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878, 881 (2d Cir. 1937). It would
not be in the best interest of public policy to recognize the expense of an illegal act as
"ordinary and necessary." Sarah Backer, I B.T.A. 214 (1924). See also Tank Truck Rent-
als, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). But see Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S.
27 (1958).
" See Humphreys v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 340, 343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
637 (1942); H.S. Anderson, 35 B.T.A. 10, 11 (1936):
It is now established without any conflicting decisions that the illegality of the occu-
pation or the transactions in which a taxpayer engages deprives him of any claim
to the use of losses or expenses in reducing his taxable net income.
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view by recognizing the principle that illegal businesses do to some
extent have expenses which do not per se frustrate a state or national
policy." However, since deductibility is not dependent solely upon
the legitimacy of the business, there are still instances where deduc-
tions in legal businesses are denied."2
Prior to the 1954 Code, considerable effort was devoted to de-
fining the concept of public policy as a bar to deductions."3 In fact,
a proposed statute considering the problem was drafted by the
American Law Institute."' The suggested provision was at most a
codification of the fundamental ideas developed by prior case law."
It was the purpose of the statute to disallow a deduction for any
expenditure which was itself illegal or contrary to public policy, or
made in discharge of an obligation in the nature of a fine or penalty
imposed by law which, if allowed as a deduction, would clearly
frustrate the legislative policy imposing the obligation." Conversely,
the proposed statute would allow deduction of an expenditure made
in payment of a fine or penalty which was compensatory in nature
and unavoidable in the normal pursuit of a lawful enterprise." Un-
fortunately, however, no public policy provision was included in the
1954 Code; thus, the contemporary taxpayer must rely on case-law
development in determining public policy questions concerning
deductible expenditures.
"Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
1 See pp. 236-48 infra.
aSenator Kefauver introduced an amendment in 1951 that would disallow expenses
incurred in illegitimate wagering. 97 Cong. Rec. 12230-31 (1951). See also S. Rep. No.
141, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1951). Unfortunately, this amendment was defeated because
of the fear of some Senators that the tax would amount to a penalty imposed for a viola-
tion of state laws and thus be unconstitutional under United States v. Constantine, 296
U.S. 287 (1935); Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922). For a general review of the
legislative history of the business deduction Code sections, see Paul, The Use of Public
Policy by the Commissioner in Disallowing Deductions, 1954 Major Tax Problems 715,
723-28; Note, 5 N.Y.L.F. 208, 212 (1959).
14 ALI Fed. Income Tax Stat § X154(i), May 1952 Draft. The proposed statute read as
follows:
Public Policy. - No deduction shall be allowed for any disbursement which is -
(1) itself illegal or contrary to public policy; or (2) made on account of an obliga-
tion in the nature of a fine or penalty imposed by law and not primarily for com-
pensatory damages nor unavoidable in normal conduct of the taxpayer's lawful
gainful activity, if the deduction of the disbursement for tax purposes would clearly
frustrate a policy of the legislation imposing the obligation.
"See Comments, ALI Fed. Income Tax Stat. § X1 54(i), pp. 282, 286, May 1952 Draft.
However, apparent difficulty was expressed with the proposed statute in view of the incon-
sistency in public policy application illustrated by prior decisions. See Comments, supra at
286-87.
"6 See Comments, supra note 15, at 286-87.
" See Comments, supra note 15, at 287.
"-Iowever, section 162(c) is closely analogous to a "public policy provision."
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B. Treatment in Legitimate Businesses
1. Statutory Violations
a. Violation of Wage and Price Regulations
(1) Payment for wages.-In an effort to control inflation dur-
ing war years, Congress passed legislation determining maximum
wage stabilization, often delegating the rate-setting to administrative
agencies."
Under regulations promulgated pursuant to these statutes,
the Commissioner disallowed the deduction of excess wages paid in
contravention of the statutes. In protesting against the disallowance,
taxpayers made arguments that the wages constituted part
of the cost of goods sold; it was also contended that, inasmuch as
the taxpayer sold services, the wages represented a return of capital,
disallowance of which would constitute imposition of a tax on gross
receipts in violation of the sixteenth amendment of the federal con-
stitution." The courts, however, rejected these arguments and found
that wages constituted neither a part of the cost of goods sold nor a
return of capital. 1 Specifically, the approach has been taken that
labor costs are deductible only to the extent that they do not con-
travene the regulatory statutes."
1"Defense Production Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 798 (1952), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2061
(1951); Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 23 (1943), 50 U.S.C.A. App.
5 901 (1951); Stabilization Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 765 (1943), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 961
(1951).
"°See Pedone v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 581 (Ct.Cl.) (dissent), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 829 (1957); Ray Edenfield, 19 T.C. 13 (1952); Woodside Acres, Inc., 46 B.T.A.
1124 (1942), aff'd, 134 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1943); Sidney Zehmar, 27 T.C. 876 (1957),
aff'd sub. nom., Solon Decorating Co. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 424 (6th Cir. 1958);
Weather-Seal Mfg. Co., 16 T.C. 1312 (1951), aff'd, 199 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1952). Under
the sixteenth amendment of the federal constitution a tax may not be levied on amounts
representing return of capital. Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918).
21 Pedone v. United States, supra note 20; Gilmore v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 581
(N.D. Cal. 1955); Sidney Zehman, supra note 20; Weather-Seal Mfg. Co., supra note 20.
See also I.T. 4105, 1952-2 Cum. Bull. 93; Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23 (a)-16 (1943). Even
if the wages did constitute part of the cost of goods sold, they could still be disallowed.
The court in Weather-Seal Mfg. Co., supra, expressed the view that the Commissioner had
the power to juggle the "not so sacrosanct" item of cost of goods sold to fit the situation,
citing as examples: American Pitch Pine Export Co. v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 721 (5th
Cir. 1951); Majestic Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1941).
52 The correctness of this approach was seriously questioned in the dissenting opinion in
Pedone v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 288, 292 (Ct. Cl. 1957). There the view was taken
that a tax on gross receipts is unconstitutional, and that, under the sixteenth amendment,
the return of capital (i.e., cost) must be allowed as a deduction from gross receipts before
the income tax is levied. Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918). Gross income
(to which the tax is applied) is determined by subtracting from gross receipts the cost of
goods sold. This view is premised upon the cost of goods sold representing return of capital.
The cost of producing an item for sale usually consists of materials, labor, and certain other
costs, the varying proportions of these ingredients depending upon the nature of the item
produced. With regard to the cost of materials the Commissioner cannot disallow any part
of their cost, based on one of two theories: (1) materials constitute a part of the cost of
the goods sold and there is no statutory provision in the Code regulating their deductibility;
1960] COMMENTS
(2) Payment for materials.-The question of whether allowance
of a deduction for materials purchased in violation of maximum price
regulations would frustrate the policy of the price regulations has not
received considerable attention in the courts. By statutory interpreta-
tion, the courts distinguished price violations for materials" from
violations of wage stabilization regulations on the ground of legisla-
tive intent." As there was specific statutory authority authorizing
disallowance of excess wage payments" and no comparable authority
existed for material price violations, s the plain inference was that
the full cost of materials should be deductible regardless of maximum
price violations. Moreover, courts were reluctant to uphold the
Commissioner's disallowance because of the constitutional question of
taxing gross receipts. s
(3) Labor law violations.-The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts
Act regulates the employment of minors and also prescribes minimum
wage and overtime wage rates.2" Violation of the child labor provision
of the act subjects an employer to a penalty and liquidated damages,
with the result that deduction of these amounts is denied on the basis
and (2) the cost of an item produced for sale is beyond the Commissioner's scimitar of
disallowance under the sixteenth amendment.
With regard to labor costs properly constituting a constituent part of the cost of pro-
ducing an item for sale, the dissent in the Pedone case concluded that such labor costs
should also be beyond the Commissioner's scimitar of disallowance under the sixteenth
amendment. 151 F. Supp. at 297.
If the dissenter's conclusion is correct, the constitutionality of section 162(a) of the
1954 Code is questionable. This section provides that salaries, wages, and other
compensation are deductible only to the extent that they are reasonable in amount. Under
a literal reading of the section, labor costs properly constituting a constituent of cost of
goods sold would be allowed only to the extent they are reasonable in amount. Excessive
labor costs are disallowed. This interpretation would result in a reduction of cost of goods
sold and consequently a tax levied to some extent upon gross receipts or return of capital.
The constitutionality of the section could, however, be sustained (assuming the dissenter's
argument is correct) by construing the section to be applicable only to those labor costs
which are remotely or indirectly connected with the cost of producing goods or rendering
services; labor costs directly connected would be awarded the same treatment as materials.2 3 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 23, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 901 (1951).
24Commissioner v. Weisman, 197 F.2d 221 (1st Cir. 1952); Hofferbert v. Anderson
Oldsmobile, Inc., 197 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1952); Clark v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 554
(N.D. Tex. 1951); Lela Sullenger, 11 T.C. 1076 (1948).
25 See p. 236 supra.
26 Commissioner v. Weisman, 197 F.2d 221 (Ist Cir. 1952). However, Rev. Rul. 56-180,
1956-1 Cum. Bull. 94, specifically sanctioned a deduction of payments made in violation of
the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, and which are not certified for disallow-
ance to the Internal Revenue Service by the Economic Stabilization Agency or its authorized
components. When a violation of a price regulation statute occurred, the administrative
office would forward the information to the Internal Revenue Service for purposes of dis-
allowing the deduction.
'7 Commissioner v. Weisman, supra note 26.
28Lela Sullenger, 11 T.C. 1076 (1948) at 1077:
Section 23 makes no provision for the cost of goods sold, but the Commissioner has
always recognized, as indeed he must to stay within the Constitution, that the cost
of goods sold must be deducted from gross receipts in order to arrive at gross income.
2949 Star. 2036 (1936), 41 U.S.C.A. § 35 (1957).
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of public policy." However, payments for minimum wage and
overtime violations, even though termed liquidated damages, are
deductible."
Similarly, violation of the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act" relating to minimum wage and overtime violations does not
preclude deduction of amounts paid, as such payments are compen-
satory, not penal, in nature." Further, payments to satisfy an award
of the National Labor Relations Board have been regarded as proper
subjects of deduction."
b. Violation of SEC Regulations.-Section 16 (b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934" was enacted to prevent economic gain ob-
tained through abuse of a fiduciary relation with a corporation listed
on a national exchange. Specifically, this section requires payment to
the corporation of profits realized by an "insider"' " through trading 7
within a six-month period in non-exempt equity securities of the
corporation." The operation of section 16(b) presents the problem
of deductibility of this payment by the insider for income tax pur-
poses.
There is no dispute that the payment received by the corporation
constitutes taxable income."0 Not so clear, however, is the allowance
of the deduction to the fiduciary." Initially, the Tax Court decided
against tax relief for the fiduciary on the basis that allowance of the
a°Davenshire, Inc., 12 T.C. 958 (1949); Cleveland Overall Co., 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
555 (1949); I.T. 3894, 1948-1 Cum. Bull. 28.
3 IT. 3894, 1948-1 Cum. Bull. 28.
32 52 Stat. 1060, 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. § 201, 216 (b) (1956).
3I.T. 3762, 1945 Cum. Bull. 95.
'
4 I.T. 3412, 1940-2 Cum. Bull. 174.
3Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 48 Star. 881, 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C.A.
78a, 78p(b) (1951). For a thorough analysis of this section see Cook & Feldman, Insider
Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 385, 612 (1953); Cole, In-
sider's Liabilities Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 12 Sw. L.J. 147 (1958).
"s An "insider" is defined as any corporate director, officer or owner of ten per cent of
any class of non-exempt equity security of the issuing corporation which is listed on a
national exchange. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(a) (1951).
a" Trading includes any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase.
a"See Cook & Feldman, supra note 35; Cole, supra note 35.
3' Section 16(b), by its express terms, is operative irrespective of assy intention on the
part of the insider.
" See General Am. Investors Co. v. Commissioner, 348 U.S. 434 (1955), deciding that
the recovery of insider's profits would be taxable as income on the basis of Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), which had reasoned that exemplary damages for
fraud and the punitive two-thirds of a treble damage antitrust recovery were income.
' By disallowance of the deduction to the fiduciary, "double taxation" results in that
both the fiduciary and the receiving corporation are taxed for receipt of the same funds;
however, "double taxation" has not been a successful argument for defeating the disallow-
ance. Aluminum Co. of America v. United States, 67 F.2d 172, 175 (3d Cir. 1933), 291
U.S. 666 (1934); Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks, 253 U.S. 325, 330
(1920). The courts effectively avoid this argument by tagging the payment a "penalty."
See cases cited note 42 infra.
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deduction would frustrate the efficacy of section 16(b) .4  For a
period of five years it appeared that this problem was settled. How-
ever, in 1956 the Tax Court interpreted the earlier decisions as hold-
ing that the payment would not per se frustrate the statute.43 The
1956 case, however, was distinguished from previous decisions in two
respects, viz., (1) the taxpayer's firm, an investment banking firm in
which he was a senior partner, dealt in the shares of a corporation in
which the taxpayer was a shareholder and director, and (2) the
taxpayer paid to the corporation the maximum amount for which
he could be liable under section 16(b). The court, in holding that
allowance of the deduction would not frustrate section 16(b), em-
phasized two significant factors: (1) the violation was unintentional
and in the normal course of the investment banking business; and
(2) the fiduciary taxpayer in paying over the profit to the corpora-
tion was motivated by a desire to protect the reputation of his firm
and to avoid litigation expenses.
c. Antitrust Violations.-Deductions for fines or settlements for
violations of state antitrust laws have been consistently disallowed."
There is, however, no express authority for disallowance of fines or
settlements for federal antitrust violations. Disallowance apparently
follows," in view of the similarity between antitrust violations and
violations of other federal statutes where disallowance has been
established." Moreover, there seems to be no valid distinction between
the deduction treatment accorded state antitrust violations and fed-
eral antitrust violations. Regarding recovery of treble damages in
private litigation, the main emphasis has been placed upon the taxa-
tion of the payments to the plaintiff, rather than the deduction by
the defendant. 7 Although there are theories to the contrary, it is
zRobert Lehman, 25 T.C. 629 (1955); William F. Davis, Jr., 17 T.C. 549 (1951);
William L. Dempsey, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 936 (1951); I.T. 4069, 1952-1 Cum. Bull. 28
(which further provides that the amount cannot be added to the basis of securities retained).
43 Laurence M. Marks, 27 T.C. 464 (1956) (specifically referring to William F. Davis,
Jr., supra note 42).
4 Universal Atlas Cement Co. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 971 (1947), aff'd per curiam,
171 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 962 (1949) (Texas); Commissioner
v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728
(1945) (Texas); Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.
1931) fines and counsel fees not deductible--New York); Robert S. LeSage, 6 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 1263 (1947), rev'd on other grounds, 173 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1949). Cf.
Columbus Bread Co., 4 B.T.A. 1126 (1926) (Ohio).
4SAtty. Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 352 (1955).
"See authorities cited notes 21, 30, 42 supra. Compare the treatment of attorney's fees
incurred in antitrust suits. See p. 243 infra.
" Doyle, Treble Damages and Counsel Fees, An Antitrust Handbook 549 (Section of
Antitrust Law, American Bar Association 1953-54) (1958); Costigan, Income Taxes on
Recoveries from Civil Litigation, 1954 Major Tax Problems 559, 575 (1954); Comment,
Income Taxation and Treble Damage Antitrust Awards, 48 Nw. U.L. Rev. 85 (1954);
Comment, The Taxability of Punitive Damages, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1052 (1953).
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probable that such payments or settlements are not the proper subjects
of deduction." One theory would treat treble damages (or a com-
promise payment in settlement) as liquidated damages, allowing
deduction, possibly on an allocation basis."
d. Fines, Penalties, and Settlement Payments.--Generally, courts
disallow deduction of fines and penalties incurred in the course of a
trade or business on the ground of public policy." The theory for
denial rests upon the fact that, if the amount were allowed, there
would be a remittance of a portion of the fine or penalty, thereby
lessening the effect of the statute penalizing the taxpayer's conduct."1
Often, however, the offender will negotiate a settlement in lieu of the
fine or penalty. Recognizing the similarity of penalties to such settle-
ments, courts generally have proclaimed the latter non-deductible 's
on the ground that they reflect the payment of a penalty. However,
such payments may be deductible if the taxpayer in making the set-
tlement was motivated by reasons other than the enforcement of the
penalty assessment.9
Settlement payments in lieu of liability incurred in violation of
price regulations must be distinguished. Formerly, these settlement
payments were not deductible regardless of whether the violation was
innocent or willful." The theory of disallowance was that such
payments were in essence penalties which, if allowed, would frustrate
the purpose of the price regulating statutes.
4
8Magill, The Income Tax Aspects of Antitrust Litigation, 30 Taxes 210, 214 (1952).
" Ibid. The author also suggests the possibility of capitalizing the expense over a given
period where the violating taxpayer is paying over profits made at the expense of the
plaintiff.
5"Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958); Tank Truck
Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958); Automatic Cigarette Sales Corp. v.
Commissioner, 234 F.2d 825 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 951 (1956); Chicago, R.I.
& P. Ry. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 990 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 618 (1931);
I.T. 4042, 1951-1 Cum. Bull. 15; G.C.M. 11358 XII-1 Cum Bull. 29 (1933).
" Consider the reasoning of the American Law Institute in the Comments of ALI Fed.
Income Tax Stat. § Xl54(i) 282, 286, May 1952 Draft:
While the payment of a fine is neither an illegal disbursement nor one contrary to
public policy (the activity which gave rise to the fine may be contrary to public
policy, but its payment is not), deduction of the disbursement would frustrate public
policy in that the Government would then be bearing part of the fine.
"Helvering v. Superior Wines & Liquors, 134 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1943). Cf. United
States v. Jaffray, 97 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1938), aff'd on other grounds sub nom., United
States v. Bertelsen & Petersen Engineering Co., 306 U.S. 276 (1939).
a""The test universally employed to determine the applicability of the doctrine to any
such claimed deduction is whether the sums claimed were paid as penalties." Commissioner v.
Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276, 277 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728
(1945) (dictum). Cf. Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir.
1949); "other reasons" include, e.g., desire to avoid unfavorable publicity. But see Laurence
M. Marks, 27 T.C. 464 (1956).
" Commissioner v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945); Garibaldi & Cuneo, 9 T.C. 446 (1947); Scioto Provision Co.,
9 T.C. 439 (1947). See I.T. 3799, 1946-1 Cum. Bull. 56; I.T. 3630, 1943 Cum. Bull. 113;
I.T. 3627, 1943 Cum. Bull. 111.
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However, present authority rejects this view, holding settlement
payments for innocent violations to be deductible as ordinary and
necessary expenses." The decision departing from the earlier view
was Jerry Rossman Corp. v. United States,s" which held that, since
the violation was innocent, and the Administrator of the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942"7 accepted payment of the overcharge
from the taxpayer without instituting suit for treble damages,
deduction of the payment would not frustrate the policy of the act.
2. Attorney's Fees Incurred in Litigation
The deductibility of attorney's fees depends largely upon the
nature of the activity or transaction which created the necessity for
incurring such fees and also upon the outcome of the litigation. If
the litigation involves the contest of a fine or penalty and the out-
come is unsuccessful, the taxpayer's attorney's fees are accorded the
same tax treatment as the fine or penalty and denied deduction."
"American Brewery, Inc. v. United States, 223 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1955); Commissioner
v. Pacific Mills, 207 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1953); National Brass Works, Inc. v. Commissioner,
182 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1950); Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d
Cir. 1949); Milton S. Kronheim & Co., v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 620 (Ct. Cl.
1958); Farmers Creamery Co., 14 T.C. 879 (1950). Inasmuch as the decisions were op-
posite to the rulings promulgated, the Commissioner issued Rev. Rul. 54-204, 1954-1 Cum.
Bull. 49, wherein it was declared that payments made to the federal government in settle-
ment of claims for alleged O.P.A. overcharges would be deductible if the violation was
neither willful, intentional, nor the result of the taxpayer's failure to take practical precau-
tions.
However, the cases cited pertain only to price violations in relation to materials. Since
payment of wages in violation of maximum wage regulations has been held non-deductible,
see p. 236 supra, it is questionable whether settlements for wage violation would
be allowable; although if they were innocently made, the Rossman case would probably be
followed. As this legislation has been repealed, the question is now moot.
' 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949). But see Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,
356 U.S. 30 (1958); Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958).
The Rossman decision does not necessarily overrule the decisions represented by Commission-
er v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
728 (1945). The theory of Rossman and subsequent decisions is that an ad hoc approach
will be taken to determine if frustration on any policy would occur in the allowance of the
deduction. In comparing legal expenses of an unsuccessful defense and the imposition of a
fine, the court stated:
Each may "frustrate the sharply defined policies" of a statute; that will depend upon
how one views their deterrent effect. We hold therefore that in every case the
question must be decided ad hoc. 175 F.2d 711, 713.
With no precise criterion available, it would appear that the form and name of the
payment (e.g., fine, penalty, or settlement payment) will no longer be controlling, but that
the frustration will be determined by the effect on the governmental declaration (i.e., sta-
tute) imposing the penalty or fine. In essence, this coincides with the latest view expressed
by the Supreme Court. See Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
57 56 Stat. 23' (1943), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 901 (1951).
"SBurroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178, 180 (2d Cir. 1931).
The Burroughs case after having disallowed the attorney's fees (in connection with non-
deductible fines and penalties) on the ground of not being ordinary and necessary, added at
180: "The disallowance may properly rest . . . on the grounds of public policy." How-
ever, a different approach was taken in Sarah T. Backer, 1 B.T.A. 214 (1924), by the in-
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Conversely, if the taxpayer successfully contests such fine or penalty,
his attorney's fees are deductible."
If attorney's fees are incurred in connection with the defense of
criminal charges, the fees will be deemed personal in nature" or, in
more familiar terms, not ordinary and necessary.6 Furthermore, fees
spent in contesting prosecution under the criminal section of the
1954 Code are denied deduction if the taxpayer is found guilty. " On
the other hand, attorney's fees expended in an effort to settle back
taxes admittedly due, as distinguished from an unsuccessful attempt
to prevent criminal prosecution for income tax evasion, have been
held deductible. "'
The successfulness of the litigation does not always control the issue
of deductibility. If preservation of the business depends upon re-
sisting civil enforcement of the law, attorney's fees incurred for that
purpose will be deductible notwithstanding defeat, provided that
allowance of such deduction would not conflict with some "sharply
defined public policy." 4 The theory supporting this conclusion rests
upon the fact that nothing could be more "ordinary or necessary"
than the preservation of the enterprise. 5 Moreover, where the activity
termingling of the public policy with the concept of the ordinary and necessary test:
Manifestly the commission of perjury can, under no circumstances, be recognized as
part of a taxpayer's business; and so the expense incident to such criminal activity
can likewise not be recognized. We must regard this as written into every statute,
especially as to such common crimes as are prohibited generally throughout the land-
those mala in se, which have immemorially been regarded as contrary to public wel-
fare. Id. at 216.
However, attorney's fees spent in contesting a suit brought by the Price Administrator
under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 are deductible. G.C.M. 24810, 1946-1
Cum. Bull. 55. Thus, to this extent, the Burroughs case would not govern.
" See 4 Mertens, op. cit. supra note 1, S 25.50. Of course, the proceeding must have
involved a prosecution arising out of an activity related to taxpayer's business. See Com-
missioner v. People's-Pittsburgh Trust Co., 60 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1932); Commissioner v.
Continental Screen Co., 58 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1932).
"°See Columbus Bread Co., 4 B.T.A. 1126 (1926); Norvin R. Lindheim, 2 B.T.A. 229
(1925).
61Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931); C.W.
Thomas, 16 T.C. 1417 (1951); Estate of John W. Thompson, 21 B.T.A. 568 (1930),
appeal dismissed, 62 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1932); Sanitary Earthenware Specialty Co., 19
B.T.A. 641 (1930); B.E. Levinstein, 19 B.T.A. 99 (1930); Simon Bloom, 7 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 517 (1948).
"
2
Acker v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1958), aff'd on other grounds, 361
U.S. 87 (1959); Port v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 645 (Ct. Cf. 1958).
63 Commissioner v. Schwartz, 232 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1956); accord, Greene Motor Co.,
5 T.C. 314 (1945). To an even greater extremity, attorney's fees incurred in settling a
civil claim for attempted rape were held deductible, since the particular act out of which
the claim arose was closely related to the taxpayer's business (interviewing prospective
women employees in their home). John W. Clark, 30 T.C. 1330 (1958).
64Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
65Heininger v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 1943):
Without this expense, there would have been no business. Without the business, there
would have been no income. Without the income, there would have been no tax.
To say that this expense is not ordinary and necessary is to say that that which gives
life is not ordinary and necessary.
COMMENTS
giving rise to litigation is integrally connected with the trade or
business, the test of deductibility is satisfied, regardless of the out-
come of the litigation."0 Thus, the cost of litigation for defending a
malpractice suit"7 and a breach of fiduciary relationship action" were
allowed without regard to the outcome, inasmuch as the transactions
arose directly from the operation of the taxpayer's trade or business.
Also, legal fees incurred in defense of a Sherman Act prosecution are
deductible even though the taxpayer is found guilty."
Another distinction may be made on the basis of the parties to the
suit. If the taxpayer is involved in a controversy with a party other
than the government, allowance of a deduction for attorney's fees,
even where the taxpayer is unsuccessful, does not necessarily frustrate
public policy. But where the government is the other party, public
policy is more likely to be frustrated by allowance of the deduction,
particularly where the litigation is decided in favor of the govern-
ment. Accordingly, it has been suggested that defending an action
against the government is considerably different from defending
against a private wrongdoing arising in the course of business. 0
3. Influence Payments
a. Political and Lobbying Payments.-Amounts spent to influence
legislative bodies or for political favors7 ' have consistently been dis-
allowed." One theory advanced for this disallowance is that it is
inappropriate for the government to bear any of the cost of influenc-
ing legislation. 3 Other theories advanced are that such payments (1)
can never be recognized as an ordinary and necessary business ex-
pense," and (2) cannot be an ordinary and necessary business ex-
68Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928).
67 S.M. 4078, V-1 Cum. Bull. 226 (1926).
68 Isaac P. Keeler, 23 B.T.A. 467 (1931).
69 G.C.M. 24377, 1944 Cum. Bull. 93 (allowing attorney's fees even in an unsuccessful
defense for violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act); see Commissioner v. Heininger, 320
U.S. 476 (1943).7 5
-Ielvering v. Hampton, 79 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1935).
"' Other than actual bribes, treated pp. 244-46 infra.
7See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959). One reason for the con-
sistent disallowance may be attributed to the existence of a treasury regulation proscribing
this type of deduction. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23 (o)-I, § 29.23 (q)-i (1943), now Treas.
Reg. § 1.162-15 (1959). See the history of this treasury regulation in Textile Mills Securi-
ties Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 337 (1941). See also F. Strauss & Son, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 251 F.2d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 1958), aff'd sub. nom., Cammarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (disallowing expense of trying to persuade electorate in voting
against statewide prohibition act); Herbert Davis, 26 T.C. 49 (1956).
73 Note, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1408 (1954).7
aTextile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941); Revere Racing
Ass'n v. Scanlon, 232 F.2d 816 (Ist Cir. 1956); Rugel v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 393
(8th Cir. 1942). See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15 (1959). The definition of lobbying has even
been extended to cover representation by an attorney at a congressional hearing on a pari-
mutuel tax. Delaware Steeplechase and Race Ass'n, 9 CCH T.C. Mem. 893 (1950).
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pense if made in violation of national or state policies." However,
absent a fact situation tainted with exertion of influence, " courts are
more likely to find such expenditures deductible." For instance,
recognition is given to institutional advertising campaigns design-
ed to keep one's name before the public and promote goodwill,
provided no influence is intended and a legitimate purpose is being
served."
b. Protection Payments and Bribes.-Analogous to payments made
for political favors or lobbying are those made for the purpose of
'tprotecting" the legitimate business or interests of the taxpayer
against threatened violence or other harassing tactics, such as
malicious prosecution. Although made in the course of business, such
"protection payments" have been disallowed as deductions, either
on the theory that they do not constitute ordinary and necessary
business expenses" or that allowance of a deduction for such would
frustrate public policy."s This result probably is desirable, for denial
of deduction for protection payments may encourage the taxpayer
to resort to the proper source of law and order to solve his difficulties.
Similar to protection payments, bribes are sometimes made to in-
fluence the judgment of an individual dealing with the taxpayer's
business. In such an instance, the public policy doctrine has been
used to disallow the deductions."
In the area of rebates, kickbacks, and discounts, rather than at-
tack these expenditures as bribes," the courts have apparently carved
out an exception to the public policy doctrine, by relying upon the
existence of a well-established custom in the industry or by char-
'SWm. T. Stover Co., 27 T.C. 434 (1956).
"E.g., a letting of contracts on a competitive bid basis.
"Alexandria Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 95 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1938); Estate of
Joseph H. Scobell, 47 B.T.A. 971 (1942).
"sTreas. Reg. 1.162-15(c) (1959). This Regulation appears at I CCH 1960 Stand. Fed.
Tax. Rep. 5 1393.
7"Kelley-Dempsey & Co., 31 B.T.A. 351 (1934). Cf. cases cited notes 116 and 117
infra.
'OCf. Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc., 17 T.C. 566 (1951), where the court disallowed a
payment to quiet labor troubles because it was characteristic of a bribe. See Kelley-Dempsey
& Co., supra note 79.
'Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 363 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 688 (1942); Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc., 17 T.C. 566 (1951). See also Estate of R. W.
Lashells, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 274 (1952), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 208 F.2d 430
(6th Cir. 1953); Excelsior Baking Co. v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 423 (D.C. Minn. 1949).
82 The Commissioner has attempted to characterize the expenditure as a bribe in order
to claim it as in violation of any appropriate state statute. Eugene Richardson, 16 CCH




acterizing the payments as adjustments to reflect the true price be-
tween the parties."s
Thus kickbacks to ships' chandlers are not attacked as bribes, but
are allowable as deductions inasmuch as the kickback is the vogue of
the chandlering business.s4 In the milk industry, a deduction is al-
lowed for discounts from list price given in violation of minimum
price regulations. While the fact that the industry customarily gives
these discounts is probably significant, primarily the courts reason
that, as the amount of the discount is known at the time of the agree-
ment, the true sales price will be reflected by the net price, not the
higher, fictitious list price."
Sliding over the public policy argument with little difficulty, courts
point out that, although there are extensive violations in this field,
there are other appropriate measures for punishing the violators."
Although the above circumstances have never before justified cir-
cumvention of the public policy doctrine, the decisions allowing these
discounts indicate that, if the policy frustrated does not possess a
sufficient degree of importance, deduction will be allowed."' The
liquor industry has been accorded similar tax treatment. Although
liquor allowances and discounts do not usually violate a regulation or
statute, the reason which often justifies their deduction lies in the
necessity of meeting competition in price wars."
Allowance of kickbacks, discounts, and rebates are subject to
some limitations, however. Where there is a specific statute expressly
prohibiting a rebate, a payment made in direct violation of the
statute may frustrate public policy." Also, whatever the amount
3 Tri-State Beverage Distributors, Inc., 27 T.C. 1026 (1957); Pittsburgh Milk Co.,
26 T.C. 707 (1956).
84Fiambolis v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 10 (E.D.S.C. 1957); Frank J. Valetti, 28
T.C. 692 (1957), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 260 F.2d 185 (3d Cir. 1958); Eugene
Richardson, 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 518 (1957), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 264 F.2d
400 (4th Cir. 1959). Factually speaking, even the owners and principals know of the kick-
back (a fact which may be used in argument against the kickback constituting a bribe). The
Service apparently has taken official notice of the ship chandlering practice in kickbacks by
allowing them as ordinary and necessary expenses, finding no frustration of public policy.
Rev. Rul. 58-479, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 60. Cf. Rev. Rul. 54-27, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 44,
which requires knowledge of and consent to a kickback by the owners or principals affected
before the deduction may be taken.
8Pittsburgh Milk Co., 26 T.C. 707 (1956).
8
sId. at 716.
87 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958); Tri-State Beverage Distribu-
tors, Inc., 27 T.C. 1026 (1957); Pittsburgh Milk Co., 26 T.C. 707 (1956).
8 Tri-State Beverage Distributors, supra note 87. A cash payment for a quantity pur-
chase is not classed as a "secret rebate" if it is a customary and widespread practice in the
industry, and accordingly is deductible. Polley v. Westover, 77 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Cal.
1948).
88Boyle, Flagg & Seaman, Inc., 25 T.C. 43 (1955); Frederick C. Moser, 18 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 116 (1959).
19601
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14
of the remittance, it must be disclosed to the Internal Revenue
Service."
c. Improper Payments to Officials or Employees of Foreign Coun-
tries.-Prior to the effective date of section 162(c) (September 3,
1958), bribes or other improper payments to officials or employees of
foreign countries or its political subdivisions were not considered
"ordinary and necessary" business expenses." However, where the
foreign government itself demanded or acquiesed in the payment, a
deduction was allowed.92 Presently, an indirect or direct bribe, rebate,
or kickback to a foreign official or employee" is illegal where the
payment would be unlawful under the "laws of the United States"
-if such laws were applicable to the payment and the official at the
time the expense was paid or incurred. 4 (The "laws of the United
States" includes only federal statutes, judicial interpretations thereof,
and appropriate regulations.") Today, the fact that foreign law
permits, demands, or acquiesces in the payment is immaterial."
4. Losses
a. Gambling.-When the losses of a gambler exceed his gains, a
deduction is sometimes sought. Prior to the 1934 Code the legality
or illegality of gambling in the state where the loss occurred seemed
to control the question of deductibility. Where a state sanctioned
gambling, courts permitted deduction of gambling losses incurred
in that state over and above gambling gains. Conversely, losses were
90 See Stanley Rosenstein, 32 T.C. 230 (1959). This requirement stems from a long-
standing custom entitling the Treasury Department to the name of the payee.
'iS. Rep. 1983, 85 Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) reported in 1958-3 Cum. Bull. 937,
1045-46. (The Senate Report is hereinafter cited only in the Cumulative Bulletin.)
The provision is to apply only with respect to expenses paid or incurred after the
date of enactment of the bill. But it is specifically provided that no inference is to be
drawn from enactment of this provision, where payments prior to its effective date
are involved. As to such payments, therefore, existing rules as laid down, for ex-
ample in Commissioner v. Heininger (320 U.S. 467 (1943)); Lilly v. Commissioner
(343 U.S. 90 (1952)); and, more recently, Commissioner v. Sullivan (356 U.S. 27
(1958)), would continue to apply.
1958-3 Cum. Bull. at 1046.
9 1958-3 Cum. Bull. 937; 1 CCH 1960 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 5 11,271. The theory
was that since legal recourse was not available to the taxpayer, it would be difficult to claim
that the expenses were not ordinary and necessary.
"See definition Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18(c) (1960).
"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(c). See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18 (1960). However, a
deduction may be disallowed because its allowance would frustrate a governmentally de-
clared policy without regard to section 162(c) or this section. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18(d)
(1960). Thus, a payment may frustrate a nationally defined public policy without regard
to section 162(c). See Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958); Lilly v. Commis-
sioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952); Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
9s Supra note 94.
9" See 1958-3 Cum. Bull. 937.
"Francis M. Cronan, 33 B.T.A. 668 (1935). See also S.M. 2680, 111-2 Cum. Bull. 110
(1924), allowing deductions for gambling losses in states condoning gambling, and disallow-
ing in states prohibiting gambling.
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disallowed if the activity was not tolerated by state laws."8 The
decisions also required a showing that the transaction (where not
connected with a trade or business) was entered into for profit."
In 1934 the code changed the previous law by providing for the
deduction of gambling losses only to the extent of gambling gains in
the taxable year. ' In construing this provision the courts concluded
that, not only is it immaterial whether the transaction was entered
into for profit, but legality of gambling in the state is no longer
decisive of the issue."' Consequently, the excess of gambling losses
over gambling gains for either an illegitimate or a legitimate business
will be denied. ' This treatment met with the approval of the Ameri-
can Law Institute in its tentative drafting of the 1954 Code,' 3 and
has generally prevailed in later decisions."0 4
b. Net Operating Losses.-Obviously, the operating losses arising
from the operation of a legitimate business are deductible in accord-
ance with the net operating loss provisions of the code."' This result
does not necessarily follow when certain specific losses,0" e.g., gam-
bling, are sought to be deducted as part of net operating loss. The rule
appears to be that nothing can be utilized as a net operating loss
deduction if it could not be taken as a deduction in the year it was
98E. F. Simms, 28 B.T.A. 988 (1933); M. Rea Gano, 19 B.T.A. 518 (1930) (sum paid
in settlement of gambling debt disallowed); M. L. Heide, 2 B.T.A. 451 (1925); Appeal
of Mitchell M. Frey, Jr., 1 B.T.A. 338 (1925). Where the taxpayer is unable to segregate
losses incurred in states where gambling is legal from losses in states where gambling is
illegal, the entire amount will be disallowed. E. F. Simms, supra.
99 Beaumont v. Helvering, 73 F.2d 110 (D.C. Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 715
(1935); Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 915 (Ct. C1. 1936);
E. F. Simms, supra note 98; Appeal of Mitchell M. Frey, Jr., supra note 98.
10048 Stat. 680, 689 (1934), 26 U.S.C.A. § 23(g) (1940) (section 23(g) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1934 is now section 165(d) of 1954 Code).
" Humphrey v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 853 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 817
(1947). Section 23 of the Revenue Act of 1934 (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 165 (d)
provides:
In computing net income there shall be allowed as deduction: . . . (g) Wagering
losses. Losses from wagering transactions shall be allowed only to the extent of the
gains from such transactions.
The main purpose of the section was to bring about conformity by limiting deductions
for legalized gambling to the same as would be allowed for illegal gambling. See H.R. 704,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1934); S. Rep. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1934).
" See Skeeles v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 242 (Ct. Cl.). cert. denied, 341 U.S. 948
(1951). Moreover, there is no distinction between a professional and an amateur gambler
in the disallowance of the "excess" losses. See Roy T. Offutt, 16 T.C. 1214 (1951). The
Skeeles case is also decisive of the point that the amount cannot be deducted under section
23(e) (1) of the 1939 Code as a business loss, since section 23(h) is the more specific and
will control over a general section purporting to cover the same situation.
'0' See American Law Institute, Tentative Draft, op. cit. supra note 51, at 283.
"°4E.g., Roy T. Offutt, 16 T.C. 1214 (1951). See also Winkler v. United States, 230
F.2d 766, 776 (lst Cir. 1956) where Offutt and Skeeles, 95 F. Supp. 242 (Ct. Cl. 1951),
are distinguished, but admitting that a professional gambler cannot deduct legal net gam-
bling losses against other forms of income under section 23(h) of the 1939 Code.
.. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 172.
o
09 Roy T. Offutt, 16 T.C. 1214 (1951).
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incurred."0 ' This rule would have particular application to gambling
losses, since they are deductible only to the extent of gambling
gains in the taxable year."'8
c. Losses Proximated by Legislative Action.--Governmental legisla-
tive action often has resulted in losses to legitimate businesses. In some
instances losses are occasioned as a direct result of the legislation; in
other cases, as a collateral result.
In Western Wine & Liquor Co.,' a liquor dealer sustained a loss
through the sale of stock held in a distillery. Because of a shortage
in the supply of whiskey occasioned by governmental regulation, the
taxpayer had acquired the stock in order to buy pro rata quantities of
whiskey from the distillery. The Tax Court held the loss deductible
as a part of the cost of the whiskey acquired rather than as a capital
loss.
In contrast, prohibition during the 1920's caused most breweries to
become obsolete. When a deduction was sought for that obsolescence,
the Supreme Court denied the deduction on the ground that Congress
did not intend tax relief to result from the passage of the eighteenth
amendment."'
No discussion of public policy was raised in either of the above
examples, although each case conceivably could have been decided
under the public policy doctrine. In any event, the two cases are not
in conflict as one apparent distinction exists. The loss in the first case
was only an incidental and collateral effect of the legislation; but in
the second the resulting obsolescence was the very object of a con-
stitutional amendment. Consequently, it could be theorized that a
loss directly resulting from governmental action will be denied deduc-
tion while one incidentally occasioned by governmental action will
be allowed.
C. Treatment in Illegitimate Businesses
There is no express provision in the 1954 Code disallowing deduc-
tions for expenditures which are illegal per se or incurred in the
107 Skeeles v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 242 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 948
(1951); Roy T. Offutt, 16 T.C. 1214 (1951). Sea Black Dome Corp., 5 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 455 (1946), where an expense found to be personal was not allowed as a part of a
net operating loss deduction since it could not be taken during the regular taxing period.
... However, nothing would prevent the carry-over or carry-back to another taxable
year of the net operating loss occasioned by the "legitimate" operating expenses of a gam-
bling business.10918 T.C. 1090 (1952). See also Charles A. Clark, 19 T.C. 48 (1952).
".. Clarke v. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384 (1930); Renziehausen




pursuit of an unlawful business;.. rather, the treatment is founded
upon case law.11 Generally, illegal expenditures have been categorized
by the courts according to the nature of the expenditure.11'
1. Operating Expenses
In producing income, whether by legitimate or illegitimate means,
certain expenses necessarily arise. For example, rent and wages are
commonplace in the life of both legal and illegal businesses. No
serious contention could be made that these expenses of a legal busi-
ness should be disallowed (assuming they meet the statutory test
of deductibility), but the question is not easily resolved where the
business itself is illegal."' Recently, the position was taken by the
Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Sullivan1. that allowance of a
deduction of rent and wages for an illegal gambling business would
not frustrate any state policy,1 ' notwithstanding a state law making
those payments illegal. Previously, the position was taken that, if
the business was illegal, allowance of the deduction would frustrate
the policy of the law proscribing such businesses."" It is submitted
... In referring to the distinction between the lawful or unlawful character of a busi-
ness expense, the court in Heininger v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 567, 570 (7th Cir.), aff'd,
320 U.S. 467 (1943), stated:
Congress has not said that discrimination shall be made. Neither has the Depart-
ment had the hardihood to make such a material change by way of its regu-
lations. If this change is to be made and the policy altered, let Congress do it. Con-
gress would need only to add the word "legal" before the word "trade" in the third
line of Section 23 (a) (1).
We are asked in the guise of construing the words "ordinary and necessary" to
amend the statute. In other words, to engage in a little judicial legislation. We de-
cline the invitation.
See also Keesling, Illegal Transactions and the Income Tax, 5 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 26, 33
(1958).
. See National Brass Works v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 526, 530 (9th Cir. 1950), por-
tion quoted in note 2 supra. See also Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 498, 503 (1953).
' See Keesling, supra note 111; 4 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 25.131 (1954);
Schwartz, Business Expenses Contrary to Public Policy; An Evaluation of the Lilly Case,
8 Tax L. Rev. 241 (1953).
.. Cases allowing deductions: Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958), affirming
Mesi v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1957), reversing 25 T.C. 513 (1955);
Commissioner v. Doyle, 231 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1956); G. A. Comeaux, 10 T.C. 201
(1948), aff'd sub. nom., Cohen v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1949); Fred D.
Clemons, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 81 (1948), aff'd sub. nom., Cohen v. Commissioner, 176
F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1949); Ralph L. Polk, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 51 (1948), aff'd sub.
nom., Cohen v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1949). Cases disallowing deduc-
tions: Albert D. McGrath, 27 T.C. 117 (1956); Israel Silberman, 44 B.T.A. 600 (1941).
"356 U .S. 27 (1958).
" The Court reasoned that if a federal excise tax could be deducted by those in the
business of accepting wagers, so should the rent and wages be allowed. See Rev. Rul. 54-219,
1954-1 Cum. Bull. 51.
"Albert D. McGrath, 27 T.C. 117 (1956); Sam Mesi, 25 T.C. 513 (1955). The
McGrath decision refused to follow Commissioner v. Doyle, 231 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1956),
relying on its decision in Sam Mesi. The Seventh Circuit subsequently reversed the Tax
Court decision in Sam Mesi, 242 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1957), aff'd sub. nom., Commissioner
v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
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that the Sullivan case more fairly represents the present view con-
cerning deductibility of "legitimate" expenditures of illegal busi-
218
nesses.
2. Fines and Penalties
A legitimate business is not permitted a deduction for fines or
penalties when incurred in the scope of business; 11 a fortiori an
illegitimate business is accorded the same treatment."
3. Attorney's Fees Incurred in Litigation
If rent, wages, and salaries constitute deductible expenses for an
illegitimate business, 121 it could be argued that attorney's fees incurred
in defense of a prosecution for conducting such a business should be
allowed on the theory that this is an ordinary and necessary ex-
pense.' However, the courts generally take the position that such
attorney's fees are not deductible when the taxpayer is found guilty."'
Should he be acquitted, attorney's fees expended for his defense are
deductible,124 as no policy would be frustrated in defending against
false charges.
In view of Commissioner v. Sullivan,2' which allowed an illegal
business a deduction for ordinary operating expenses, a strong argu-
ment would exist in favor of deductibility of attorney's fees incurred
in defending the legality of a business. For the sake of consistency, it
could be argued that criminal prosecution is a normal operating
hazard, that defense is necessary to the preservation of the enter-
prise,12 and that such expenditure would be ordinary and necessary.
Whether this argument will be accepted in the future is dependent
upon whether Commissioner v. Sullivan is extended to its logical
conclusion.
12. Commissioner v. Sullivan represents the case law authority but future legislation may
possibly make these expenditures non-deductible. See pp. 258-59 infra.
"9 See pp. 240-41 supra.
120 Anthony Cornero Stralla, 9 T.C. 801 (1947); Harry Wiedetz, 2 T.C. 1262 (1943).
221 Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
22 Also, it seems that attorney's fees incurred in the furtherance of the business would
be accorded the same treatment.
123Port v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 645 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Thomas A. Joseph, 26 T.C.
562 (1956); C. W. Thomas, 16 T.C. 1417 (1951); Anthony Cornero Stralla, 9 T.C. 801
(1947). See MacCrowe's Estate v. Commissioner, 240 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1956).
124 Citron-Byer Co., 21 B.T.A. 308 (1930); International Trading Co., 17 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 521 (1958). See Harry Dunitz, 7 T.C. 672 (1946), aff'd per curiam on other
grounds, 167 F.2d 223 (6th Cir. 1948). The legal expenses must still meet the ordinary
and necessary business expense test before deduction is assured.
"'. 356 U.S. 27 (1958).




4. Bribes and "Protection" Payments
Because of the public interest in maintaining the integrity of public
officials and law enforcement agencies, courts consistently disallow
deductions for sums paid by illegal enterprises for protection against
arrests and criminal prosecutions as well as bribery of public
officials."2 ' Similarly, an illegal business paying "tribute" money to
another illegal operator can claim no deduction.2 8
The deductibility of such payments has been treated previously;...
section 162 (c) of the Code makes no distinction between legal and
illegal businesses.
5. Losses
a. Gambling.-Frequently, courts give obeisance to the principle
that illegality alone does not warrant a more stringent application
of the tax laws than that accorded legal enterprises."' Consequently,
illegal businesses are allowed the same deduction for gambling losses
under section 165 (d) of the 1954 Code as legitimate businesses; i.e.,
the loss is deductible to the extent of gambling gains."' As stated pre-
viously, this result has been achieved through court interpretation of
the congressional intent in enacting section 165 (d), according in-
discriminant treatment to gambling losses regardless of the legality
of gambling in the state in which the loss arose.
b. Net Operating Losses.-On the theory that income from illegal
operations is taxed in the same manner as income from legal enter-
prises,"' it would appear that the loss provisions of the code would
apply with equal force."' Although there are no cases in point, one
Board of Tax Appeals decision disallowed a loss arising from the opera-
".. See, e.g., G. A. Comeaux, 10 T.C. 201 (1948), aff'd sub. nim., Cohen v. Commission-
er, 176 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1949). In deciding against deductibility, the courts have
probably taken into account sub silentio the public policy of preserving the integrity of
public officials.
". See Cohen v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 394, 400 (10th Cir. 1949).
"' See pp. 244-46 supra.
l. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943). See Anthony Cornero Stralla, 9
T.C. 801 (1947). Consider the highly-quoted statement in Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327
U.S. 404, 408 (1946): "Moral turpitude is not a touchstone of taxability." Also, the
language in Steinberg v. United States, 14 F.2d 564, 566 (2d Cir. 1926):
But these considerations of civic morals, however potent they should be in the
Legislature or with prosecuting officers, who are required to choose and not abuse
their weapons against crime, the courts are bound to administer the law as it is
found, regardless of considerations of morals, policy, or taste, suitable for the legis-
lative or executive branches. Our duty and our only power is to ascertain what the
Legislature means by what it has said, and then enforce what was said.
'1 See pp. 246-47 supra.
.. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
..' See Steinberg v. United States, 14 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1926).
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tions of an illegal business. 3 ' It seems that this position is inconsis-
tent.3 with that taken by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Sul-
livan.13" Under the reasoning of the Sullivan case a net operating loss
deduction should be allowed to an illegal enterprise, at least insofar as
it consists of "legitimate" items, such as rent, wages, and salaries.""
c. Investments and Governmental Confiscation.-Frequently, illegal
enterprises sustain losses occasioned by governmental confiscation of
property or investments. Courts consistently disallow a deduction
sought for such losses, reasoning that allowance of the deduction
would give the taxpayer a remittance in the form of tax relief, thereby
frustrating the efficacy of the law authorizing the confiscation."'
Under this theory, deductions have been denied for losses occasion-
ed by governmental confiscation of enemy alien property,"' an in-
vestment in an illegal night club, 4' and an investment in a counterfeit
money business. " However, in one case the taxpayer was allowed a
deduction for a loss of an illegal investment where his participa-
tion had been obtained fraudulently."2
134 Lawrence A. Wagner, 30 B.T.A. 1099 (1934). N.B. This was not a net operating
loss case. However, if a loss is not deductible in the year incurred, it may not be used as
a net operating loss. See pp. 247-48 supra.
"3SSee pp. 255-58 infra.
'3'356 U.S. 27 (1958).
"'For example, assume a year's gambling operations as follows:
Gambling gains $1,000,000
Gambling losses 950,000
Gross Income $ 50,000
Less expenses:
Rent, wages, and salaries 90,000
Net operating loss ($ 40,000)
Note that a profit exists before the legitimate overhead expenses cause a net loss for the
year. Often, however, allocating operating expenses can be considerably more difficult than
the illustration implies.
'Fuller v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1954); Hiram E. Bowles, 13 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 510 (1954); Andrew Kjar, P-H B.T.A. Mem. Dec. 5 41,446 (1941).
". United States v. Algemene Kunstzijde Unie, N.V., 226 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1955)
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 969 (1956).
.. Hiram E. Bowles, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 510 (1954).
'Luther M. Richey, Jr., 33 T.C. No. 31 (1959).
142Curtis H. Muncie, 18 T.C. 849 (1952). Deduction was allowed to the victim
of a "Spanish prisoner" swindle where the taxpayer lost his chances for sharing in
wealth and his capital investment in an attempt to free a prisoner south of the border.
The Commissioner's argument was that allowance of the deduction would frustrate foreign
policy since the swindling operation was against the law in Mexico. However, the Tax Court
held that, as the loss was treated as theft under Mexican law, it should be allowed.
But cf. Reg. § 1.162-18, proposed 9-24-59, adopted 1-26-60 in T.D. 6448, where a de-
duction will not be allowed for a kickback or a bribe to an official or employee of a foreign
country when such payment would frustrate a governmentally declared policy of the United
States, or the payment would be a violation of United States laws, if such were applicable.
This regulation also appears at 25 Fed. Reg. 677 (1960).
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II. THE ADVENT OF LILLY V. COMMISSIONER 143
A. The First Stepping Stone: Commissioner v. Heininger
Although decided nine years before the Lilly case,'" Commissioner
v. Heininger"' shaped certain fundamental principles in the tax field
which made a later decision necessary in order to fix the dimensions
of the public policy doctrine. In Heininger the very existence of a
business depended upon incurring certain expenditures. Because of
its fraudulent operations, the taxpayer's mail order business was be-
ing closed down by order of the Postmaster General. To resist the
order, the taxpayer spent large sums for legal fees and expenses. The
Commissioner, who was upheld by the Board of Tax Appeals, 4 '
denied deduction of such fees and expenses because of the inherent
illegal operation of the business for which the sums were expended.
This approach was rejected by the Court of Appeals,' and by the
Supreme Court.4 s Two distinct points were clarified by the Supreme
Court. First, it is not essential that the business or expenditure be
for any legal purpose before an expense may be characterized as
ordinary and necessary; i.e., the mere fact that an expenditure bears a
remote relation to an illegal act does not make it non-deductible.
Secondly, the public policy doctrine was limited in application to the
situation where allowance of the deduction would frustrate sharply
defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of con-
duct. 4 ' The Court reasoned that no public policy would be frustrated
in this instance as the efficacy of the fraud order would remain unim-
paired by allowance of the deduction. Rather than use the code as
a punitive device in the absence of a clear congressional intent to that
effect, the Court noted that a separate criminal statute existed which
could be used if punishment should be given.'
Until Lilly v. Commissioner,"' courts relied upon the Heininger
143343 U.S. 90 (1952), 27 A.L.R.2d 492 (1953).
... Lilly v. Commissioner, supra note 143. The Lilly case also appears at Ct. D. 1741,
1952-1 Cum. Bull. 16.
145320 U.S. 467 (1943).
14647 B.T.A. 95 (1942).
147133 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1943).
148320 U.S. 467 (1943).
140 Note the Court's language in commenting upon the trend of the decisions:
The Bureau . . . and the federal courts have from time to time . . . narrowed the
generally accepted meaning of the language used in § 23 (a) in order that tax
deduction consequences might not frustrate sharply defined national or state poli-
cies proscribing particular types of conduct. 320 U.S. at 473.
150320 U.S. at 474.
11343 U.S. 90 (1952).
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case for the proposition that public policy must be "sharply defined"
before frustration results from the allowance of the deduction. 5'
B. Lilly v. Commissioner: Its Effects and Consequences
1. General Considerations
The Lilly decision15 characterized the nature of the public policy
which must be "frustrated" by allowance of a deduction. Kickbacks
to oculists, who referred patients to the taxpayer-optician for the
fitting of glasses, were sought to be deducted as ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses. These kickbacks were disclosed to the patient
only upon request. Agreeing with the Tax Court,'54 the Court of
Appeals... disallowed the claimed deduction on the ground that the
doctor owes a fiduciary duty to his patient, and that the agreement for
rebates is inconsistent with this obligation. Further, the court noted
that these practices were not consistent with the policies of the state
medical society or its national counterpart.
The Supreme Court rejected these views,' reasoning that "the
policies frustrated must be national or state policies evidenced by some
governmental declaration of them. 157 Relying heavily upon Hein-
inger, the Court concluded that public opinion alone is insufficient
for the application of the public policy doctrine. Another basis of
the Court's decision may be found in its recognition of the widely-
established and customary practice of kickbacks in this type of
business. This perhaps would explain prior decisions allowing deduc-
tions for discounts in the milk and liquor industries usually given in
violation of state price regulations,"' as well as allowance of deduc-
tions of kickbacks in the ship chandlering business. 5' Thus, a strong
argument could be made in favor of deductibility by showing a uni-
versal and established practice of making the type of payment claimed
for tax purposes.
152E.g., Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949); Polley v.
Westover, 77 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Cal. 1948); Greene Motor Co., 5 T.C. 314 (1945).
153343 U.S. 90 (1952).
"'14 T.C. 1066 (1950). The Tax Court's opinion demonstrated the need for clarity,
as the bar of public policy was seemingly applied upon the ethical judgment of the court.
14 T.C. at 1079-86. This approach was criticized by the dissent. 14 T.C. at 1088.
1'5 188 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1951).
1 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
157 Id. at 97. In Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 34 n.6 (1958)
the Court leaves open the question of whether a statute is required in order to constitute
a governmental declaration, implying that it may take other forms.
The practicality of the Lilly doctrine was immediately relied upon by the Commissioner
in allowing fee-splitting between surgeons, provided the transaction would fit within the
principles of the Lilly case. I.T. 4096, 1952-2 Cum. Bull. 91.
15 See p. 245 supra.
159 See p. 245 supra.
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2. The Post-Lilly Era
In the light of the more recent decisions, Commissioner v. Sul-
livan.. and Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,"' the status
of the present law is uncertain. The Lilly and Sullivan cases applied
the public policy doctrine independently of the "ordinary and neces-
sary" test."2 However, in Tank Truck Rentals, the Court stated that
an expense could not be necessary "if allowance of the deduction
would frustrate sharply defined national or state policies prescribing
particular types of conduct, evidenced by a governmental declaration
thereof."'' 3 Such language indicates that the two tests are applied
concurrently rather than independently. Thus, while the pre-Lilly
cases, which applied the "ordinary and necessary" test without regard
to public policy considerations, are not necessarily disturbed by Lilly
and Sullivan,"' Tank Truck Rentals confuses the issue considerably.
Moreover, while Sullivan is troublesome in the foregoing respect, it
also creates problems of its own.
a. The Sullivan and Tank Truck Rental Cases.-Aside from rep-
resenting the law governing deductibility of rent and wages of
illegal gambling enterprises, the Sullivan 1. case also seems to represent
a departure from the Lilly rule.' To illustrate: the Supreme Court
tacitly admits that payment of the rent and wages constituted a
violation of Illinois state law." 7 This much alone has usually been a
sufficient ground for disallowance."' Yet, the opinion places no
emphasis on frustration of state policy; federal policy is mentioned
and disposed of as not being frustrated. However, in Tank Truck
Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,"' decided the same day, 7' the entire
"0356 U.S. 27 (1958). The Sullivan case also appears in Ct. D. 1821, 1958-1 Cum.
Bull. 506.
"'.356 U.S. 30 (1958).
... Accordingly, a determination of whether an expense is ordinary and necessary is first
made; then, the public policy doctrine is employed.
1"3356 U.S. at 33-34.
'..See Lurie, Deductibility of "Illegal" Expenses, 11th Annual N.Y.U. Institute on
Federal Taxation 1189, 1205 (1953).
165 The Sullivan case involved the deductibility of rent and wages (the so-called "legiti-
mate" items) of an illegal gambling establishment paid in violation of state law.
166 The inconsistency of the Sullivan reasoning has been noted by other writers. See
Note, 5 N.Y.L.F. 208, 213 (1959); Note, 33 St. John's L. Rev. 150, 156 (1958).
... 356 U.S. at 28.
1' See p. 257 supra.
"' 356 U.S. 30 (1958). Fines imposed for operating trucks in violation of state
maximum weight laws were sought as deductions. It was recognized that the company
would operate at a loss if it conformed to the law. Consequently, violations were deliberately
made because it was "commercially impractical" to do otherwise. In some states, the viola-
tions were unintentional.
'"°Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1957) was also decided
the same day as Tank Truck Rentals and Sullivan. The facts and result of Hoover were
identical to that in Tank Truck Rentals, except that all of the violations in Hoover were
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basis for disallowance of a deduction for fines and penalties was the
frustration of state policy. The question immediately arises: why
was the deduction allowed in Sullivan not found to frustrate state
policy after the Court recited the statute violated? It is no answer
to say "the fact that an expenditure bears a remote relation to an
illegal act does not make it non-deductible,' '71 as no remote relation
exists; the expenditure was directly violative of the state statute."'
The statement by the Court, "any inference of disapproval of these
expenses as deductions is absent here, 17 is indicative of its attitude
that the payments did not violate any state policy.
The premise could be accepted that state policy simply was
not frustrated, notwithstanding that the payment did in fact violate
a state statute.'74 In essence, this view means that the court will
determine the purpose of the statute in order to find a frustration
in connection with an illegal activity. Thus, the position taken in
the Sullivan case may be that the statute. under consideration is to
be examined together with its concomitant illegal activity (i.e., gam-
bling) in order to determine the frustration. As such, no frustration
was found according to the "remote connection test" 7' enunciated in
Heininger. The difficulty with this view is that it will never be
known in advance just when a policy evidenced by governmental
declaration will be frustrated.
Still another interpretation (possibly the most logical) of Sul-
livan is indicated by the following language:
inadvertent. Nevertheless, the Court felt that frustration existed in that the state sta-
tute made no distinction between innocent and willful violations.
171 Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. at 29 (1958). The Court at this point was
quoting Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
... The Tax Court in Sam Mesi, 25 T.C. 513 (1955), rev'd, 242 F.2d 558 (7th Cir.
1957), circuit aff'd sub. nom., in Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958), after
first setting out the applicable statutes, one of which was cited in Commissioner v. Sullivan,
supra, states:
Pursuant to these sections of the criminal code of the State of Illinois, the pay-
ment of the wages in question in and of itself constituted an illegal act. . . . Cer-
tainly, it would be a clear violation of public policy to permit the deduction of an
expenditure, the making of which constitutes an illegal act. 25 T.C. at 522.
It should be remembered that, even though this reasoning was reversed in the Seventh
Circuit, 242 F.2d 558 (1957), on the authority of Commissioner v. Doyle, 231 F.2d 635
(1956), and Sullivan v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 46 (1957) (both Seventh Circuit opin-
ions), the fact remains that the payment would still be in contravention of the state statute.
The Sullivan Case was affirmed by the Supreme Court, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
173356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958).
'This view was taken in Brown, The Supreme Court 1957 Term, 72 Harv. L. Rev.
77, 116 (1958).
... Although the holding in Sullivan, if narrowly construed, is limited to state statutes
the principle could be extended to all to federal statutes and administrative rulings.
17 Viz., the fact that an expenditure may bear a "remote relation" to the illegal act
does not necessarily make it non-deductible. 320 U.S. at 474.
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Deductions are a matter of grace and Congress can, of course, disallow
them as it chooses. At times the policy to disallow expenses in
connection with certain condemned activities is clear. It was made so
by the Regulations in Textile Mills Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 US 326.
Any inference of disapproval of these expenses as deductions is absent
here- The Regulations, indeed, point the other way, for they make the
federal excise tax on wagers deductible as an ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expense. This seems to us to be recognition of a gambling enterprise
as a business for federal tax purposes. The policy that allows as a deduc-
tion the tax paid to conduct the business seems sufficiently hospitable to
allow the normal deductions of the rent and wages necessary to operate
i.177it.
n
Thus, it would appear that the Court is saying that if an illegal
business is recognized as an object of the federal taxing power,17 a
deduction will be allowed for those expenses which do not frustrate
federal policy, notwithstanding state policy to the contrary.' 9 Even
though uniformity may be achieved through the application of the
public policy doctrine according to federal policy frustration, state
policy will be ignored to the extent it is contrary to federal law. The
decision leaves open the question of what the result will be when
there is no expression of federal policy on the subject. Will the
Court then resort to ascertaining the congressional intent in search
of federal policy, or will state policy control the deduction?
Yet another basis for the holding in Sullivan may be found in the
following language:
That [the amounts are ordinary and necessary] is enough to permit
the deduction, unless it is clear that the allowance is a device to avoid
the consequence of violations of a law. . . ."' (Emphasis added.)
As applied to the facts in Sullivan, it is clear that the claimed deduc-
tions, i.e., rent and wages, were not the consequence of the statutory
violation; therefore, deduction would follow.
A new approach to the application of the public policy doctrine
is indicated by the above language, viz., the deduction will be dis-
177356 U.S. at 28-29.
178 Compare this view with the treatment accorded gambling losses. See pp. 246-47, 251
supra. It should be noted that Senator Kefauver strongly opposed the passage of the federal
excise tax on gamblers for the reason that it may elevate them into such a respectable position
that they would be accorded almost "legal" treatment. See note 13 supra. Ironically,
the Commissioner's allowance of deduction of a federal excise tax to illegal gamblers was
made the basis of the Court's holding that illegal gamblers should be entitled to a deduc-
tion of other "legitimate" expenses, viz., rent, wages, and salaries. See pp. 251-52 supra.
... Note the following language of Sullivan: " .. . or otherwise contravenes the federal
policy expressed in a statute or regulation .. " 356 U.S. at 29 (Emphasis added.). This
view is analogous to the doctrine of the supremacy of federal law, viz., when there is
an inconsistency between federal and state law, the former will control.
'
80 Id. at 29.
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allowed where it constitutes a scheme (i.e., "device") by the taxpayer
to avoid the consequences of his violation of a specific law. Previous-
ly, the generally-accepted test of deductibility turned upon whether
a federal or state policy would be frustrated by allowance. Con-
sequently, it would appear that the force of a statute would be
impaired if a deduction were allowed for the very act which the
statute proscribes. The distinction between this "new approach" and
the one previously employed is that the Sullivan approach views
frustration from the standpoint of a scheme to avoid the penal or
remedial consequences of a statutory violation as opposed to the
prior view which was whether allowance of the deduction would
frustrate the efficacy of the statute. Applying this new approach to
the companion case of Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, '
it is readily seen that the allowance of a deduction of fines incurred
would operate as a frustration, since what is sought to be deducted
is the consequence of the violated statute."8' Whether or not
the Sullivan case has definitely enunciated this new approach is un-
certain; it remains for the Court to clarify the matter in future
decisions.
b. Proposed Code Amendment.-A recent legislative recommenda-
tion from the Department of Justice to Congress has been incorpor-
ated in a bill that would add a new code section disallowing expendi-
tures for rent, wages, or salaries incurred or paid in violation of feder-
al or state law.' Should these recommendations be enacted, there
would be a reversal of the Supreme Court ruling in Commissioner v..
Sullivan,' 4 which allowed to the taxpayer who was engaged in an un-
lawful enterprise deductions for rent and wages. However, the
anticipated code section would not embrace all criminal expendi-
tures, but only those pertaining to "rent, wages, or salaries." Con-
sequently, the field of deductibility would be limited only to a
certain extent, for it is conceivable that an illegal business may still
have expenditures that would escape the bar of public policy, yet
fail to be covered by the new section.
.1356 U.S. 30 (1958).
"' The Court seemingly makes no distinction on the basis of whether the violation it-
self was inadvertent or intentional. 356 U.S. at 36.
"3'46 CCH Taxes On Parade No. 25, Part I, at 3 (June 3, 1959); H.R. 7394, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) provides as follows:
Sec. 274. Criminal Expenditures.
No deduction otherwise allowable under this sub-title shall be allowed for any
amount paid or incurred for rent, wages, or salaries if under any statutes of the
United States in which such amount is paid or incurred, the payment of such
amount constitutes a crime punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.
Deductions are a matter of legislative grace and may be disallowed if the prescribed code
requirements are not met. Thus, no constitutional question is involved.
1s4356 U.S. 27 (1958).
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Assuming the enactment of the proposed code section, a prob-
lem of interpretation may arise. It would probably be argued that
by Congress' express disallowance of rent, wages, and salaries, there
is an implied allowance of other like expenditures. ' The vulnerabili-
ty of the proposal to such an argument illustrates the undersirability
of piecemeal codification of the public policy doctrine.
c. Payola Deductions.-The next development in the field of public
policy will probably reflect public reaction to the recent "payola,"
or undercover payments, made by record distributors in an effort to
get their records broadcast." 6 Presently, there is no express statute
making payola a federal crime, although numerous proposals are in
the making. Consequently, it may be questionable whether the pay-
ments could be disallowed under the public policy doctrine, since
there is no governmental declaration of that policy. Were the pay-
ments to be considered in the nature of a bribe, disallowance may
follow. ' However, the cases disallowing bribery payments were
decided before Lilly v. Commissioner... during a period when gov-
ernmental declaration of policy was not a requirement of the public
policy doctrine. Under Lilly and Heininger, a payment which is
merely offensive to public opinion and not violative of law is al-
lowed."s'
III. THE USE OF THE CODE-TAXATION OR REFORMATION?
Apart from the difficulty of determining the bounds of the public
policy doctrine, one question remains: Should the code be employed
to reform the illegal elements of society, or should it remain merely a
revenue-gathering device?
The often-quoted phrase "moral turpitude is not a touchstone of
taxability" ' is usually found in arguments that the code should
exist for purposes of taxation only. It has been expressed that the
code since its inception has not been a device for reformation of
men's characters, ' the theory being that law enforcement should be
181 This would be nothing more than the application of the axiom expressio unius, i.e.,
the express mention of one is the implied exclusion of others.
.. Wall Street Journal, Friday, February 12, 1960, p. 2.
187 See pp. 244-46, 2S1 supra.
188 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
188 The deductibility of payola may turn on the outcome of charges filed against the
record distributors by the Federal Trade Commission; the complaints allege that "payola"
constitutes an unfair trade practice. Wall Street Journal, Friday, February 12, 1960, p. 2.
'"Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 408 (1946).
" Paul, The Use of Public Policy by the Commissioner in Disallowing Deductions,
1954 Major Tax Problems 715, 737-42, advocates the Code for purely taxing purposes, not
for compelling conformity in state jurisdictions. Thus, each state should be left to enforce
its own laws without federal intervention. See 43 Cornell L.Q. 725, 727 (1958).
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sought under other legislative powers, and not intermingled with the
revenue-gathering power of Congress."'2 Moreover, considerable
strength is found in the argument that the indirect enforcement of
local law by federal taxing devices would produce two undesirable ef-
fects, viz., a tendency of relaxation of enforcement of local law by
local authorities, and an increasing encroachment of federal jurisdic-
tion into state areas.103
To the contrary, however, is the view that the increasing threat
of crime should be combated with every available weapon, one
extremely effective weapon being the broad use of the public policy
doctrine to deny the criminal a tax deduction for expenditures,
whether made for fines or for "legitimate" expenses." 4 The reason for
using the taxing power in this manner would be, of course, to dis-
courage the existence of criminal activities by minimizing the pro-
fits91 to be reaped from such activities."9 '
One policy, although expressed on an administrative level, is that
all expenses incurred in connection with illegal enterprises will be
disallowed.' There is little doubt that the expense disallowance
would be constitutional, for while Congress may only tax gross in-
come under the sixteenth amendment,' there are no restrictions as
to the deductions it may disallow.' Consequently, should Congress
ever wish to avail itself of the opportunity, the claimed deductions
of illegal enterprises could be disallowed for federal income tax pur-
... Under its other legislative power where Congress has the power to regulate an ac-
tivity directly, it may use the taxing power for that purpose. McRay v. United States, 195
U.S. 27 (1904); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869). Where Congress has
no other legislative powers, the exercise of the taxing power may result in incidental regula-
tion of an activity, provided that the regulatory feature does not appear on the face of the
taxing act. Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law § 117 (1939). However, if the purpose of the
taxing statute is clearly regulatory on its face and not a subject within regulatory powers of
Congress, it will be held unconstitutional. Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922). See
generally Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today 26-30 (1958).
1: See Justice Black's dissent in Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 139 (1952).
4 See Baker, Taxation: Potential Destroyer of Crime, 29 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 197 (1951).
"' It is readily seen that the civil and criminal penalties in the code would furnish no
deterrent to one already operating an illegal enterprise.
'" See S. Rep. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1951). That this argument indicates
a deficiency in present law enforcement is immaterial. See Schwartz, Business Expenses Con-
trary to Public Policy: An Evaluation of the Lilly Case, 8 Tax L. Rev. 241, 249 (1953).
... See address by The Honorable Herbert Brownell, Jr., 78 A.B.A. Rep. 334, 338 (1953).
The absurdity of allowing deductions for criminal activities has been expressed in these
terms: "Theoretically, under the tax laws as they are now enforced, a professional killer
would be entitled to deduct from gross receipts paid for an assassination, the price of his
machine gun and his ammunition and the cost of transportation to and from the place of
murder." A.B.A., Special Crime Study Commission on Organized Crime, Final Report 55
(1950).
'Magill, Taxable Income 344-47 (Rev. ed. 1936).




poses."'0 One view maintains that the reporting of income and ex-
penses by illegitimate businesses is not dealt with as stringently by
the Service as with the ordinary taxpayer."' While a harsher applica-
tion of the code in this respect would to some extent curtail
the operation of illegitimate businesses, one might question whether
it would be worth the loss of tax dollars that would result from the
new enforcement policy. However, the indirect fostering of illegality
by inaction cannot be justified merely because illegality yields taxable
income.
Malcolm Lee Shaw
.. Cf. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), to the effect that an occupa-
tional tax on persons engaged in the business of accepting wagers is a valid exercise of the
federal taxing power and does not invade the police power of the states as given in the
tenth amendment.
20' The following attitude was adopted by Baker, supra note 194, at 217:
The gambling racket is possibly the largest industry, from the standpoint of
volume of business, rapidity of turnover, and magnitude of profit, presently op-
erating in the United States, yet it is permitted to exist without keeping financial
records, or at best the most meager of records, except such as it may have been
successful in keeping to itself. The Department has been content to accept re-
turns, together with payment of the tax admitted to be due, totally lacking in
data from which to permit verification of the accuracy thereof. Veiled reference
to income from "speculation" or from "investments" is about as far as the record
will bear. But the honest taxpayer, from fear he may omit some trumpery divi-
dend payment, is required to detail not only the name of each corporation from
which he received such a payment but also the address of its office and the amount
so received. The corporate taxpayer, or the individual engaged in operating a legi-
timate enterprise, well knows the cost and labor of keeping the complete financial
records demanded of him, and the response of the Department if such records
are not letter perfectl
